revenues have been found to be directly attributable to corporate franchise tax revenues and related fees (Engledow 2002, 146) .
We found Nevada corporations to be over represented in the SEC and PCAOB regulatory actions identified and contained in the MKK data; and over the 1993 through 2008 time period they examined. Delaware corporations were under represented during this same period. In isolation, this might not represent a matter that warrants further investigation, however, this finding is consistent with and supports the Nevada effect, where Cataldo, Oehlers and Scanlon (2009, hereafter COS) also found that Nevada was over-represented with respect to SEC regulatory suspensions for the three, separate non-random samples selected for and included in their study of SEC suspensions and other SEC-initiated actions during 2004 and 2007. Our examination of the MKK data was motivated by the work conducted by COS and the works of others publishing in the legal and financial economics literature streams. We will introduce this literature stream, which has not been the focus of any published works in the accounting and auditing literature.
We examined the MKK data (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) in the context of the market for corporate law.
We reviewed the COS findings for 2004 and 2007, which were also examined on this state of incorporation dimension, but extend both works to include a separate examination of the entire population of 2012 SEC suspensions. All four, published and non-randomly selected samples and the 2012 population lead us to conclude that Nevada corporations are subject to a relatively high incidence of SEC regulatory actions.
Furthermore, we provide relevant market comparisons. Using Compustat data, we introduce descriptive data on market share (or proportion) trends not previously identified or and academic communities. Finally, we provide a limitations and summary section. Admittedly, we raise more questions and issues than likely to be answered in any single paper. We believe that our contribution to the literature includes the introduction of these issues, available in the legal and financial economics literature, but unknown to those conducting accounting and auditing research.
THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE LAW -DELAWARE VERSUS NEVADA
There is a competitive market for corporate law. . The competition centers on which state a company chooses to incorporate within: its home state or out-of-state. States capable of generating these out-of-state incorporations enjoy increased tax revenues; in the form of corporate filing fees. In the case of Delaware, which is a huge "importer," these tax revenues are so significant that Delaware does not find it necessary to charge a sales tax and residents enjoy relatively low real property taxes. Among other states only Nevada has a significant net inflow of firms incorporating from outside their state (Bebchuk and Cohen 2003, 394) .
Nevada has been very successful in gaining market share, and specifically notes this success, relative to the market share leader, Delaware. Nevada also makes specific mention of the additional revenues enjoyed by their state, through fee increases made possible through their successful efforts.
Nevada specifically mentions Delaware and has, clearly, targeted Delaware in their bid for their growing proportion of corporations incorporated in the U.S. No other states are mentioned in their annual reports (Heller 2002 , Miller 2008 Nevada"s competitive position has been addressed in the academic literature, where legal and financial economics literature streams have shown that the mere fact that a publicly traded corporation is incorporated in the state of Delaware adds value to a firm"s stock price (Daines 2001 ). In part, this is due to the fact that the Delaware model and case law provides for consistency and predictability, while remaining flexible enough to adjust to a rapidly changing business environment (Bissell 2004) . Alternatively, these same literature streams have concluded that Nevada corporations enjoy highly permissive laws (Barzuza 2012) , and minimal reporting and disclosure requirements (Coolican 2007 
A section on securities registration by qualification is also provided on the NVSOS website (NRS) (NVSOS 2012):

The -registration by qualification‖ process is business friendly. This is a costeffective alternative to a national IPO. It takes only a couple of months to process and you can theoretically raise an unlimited amount of capital (emphasis added).
Restrictions to the above apply, but some relatively notorious and even infamous, previously published mini-cases of Nevada micro-caps, including those where SEC involvement became necessary, would appear to have been conducted in some unrestricted fashion, and, were, perhaps, motivated to raise an unlimited amount of capital.
Changing the State of Incorporation to the State Nevada
Barzuza (2011, 9) examined and found Nevada to be "an important destination for public-firm incorporations for more than ten years." Published mini-cases of relatively notorious micro-cap firms incorporated in and/or changing their state of incorporation to the state of promote their stock to increase the stock price, and dramatically increase the number of shares issued (i.e., dilution) to raise capital. They did this while retaining controlling interest through complex issues of preferred stocks with convertible features and/or through the use of convertible debt instruments. Frequently, the "pump and dump" would be followed by a dramatic reverse split, a firm name and ticker symbol change, and embarkation on a new and completely unrelated business venture, only to repeat the process under the new firm name and ticker symbol. In this way, these firms could, theoretically, raise an unlimited amount of capital. and Chapter 7 liquidation of this Nevada corporation, characterized by the SEC as existing "primarily as a vehicle for fraud". 12 During the period of SEC scrutiny, the CEO claimed that his firm"s declining stock price was due to naked shorting (the source of one of the sample of firms examined by COS 2009 with respect to their state of incorporation). The SEC determined that the CEO was, in fact, the source of sales of billions of shares of unregistered stock.
MKK, COS, COMPUSTAT AND SEC DATA -DELAWARE VERSUS NEVADA
We extended our examination of the data and the MKK time period (1993 through 2008) where their three samples were also non-randomly selected and were also focused on SEC trading suspensions and other regulatory actions. We present these measures in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 here]
During 2004, Nevada and Delaware enjoyed 4% and 51% of U.S. corporations (see Table   2 ). This is a ratio of approximately 1:12 or 1:13, favoring Delaware. Targeted 
13
We do not, however, rely entirely on the MKK and COS samples. Table 3 ).
As Figure 2 illustrates, Nevada"s market share (or the proportion of corporations incorporated in the state of Nevada) has nearly tripled from 1998 through 2011. When a comparable figure is generated for Delaware, Figure 3 illustrates that the dramatic increase in Nevada"s market share appears to be inversely correlated with the decline in Delaware"s market Compustat data suggest that market capitalization for Delaware corporations were ten times those of Nevada corporations. Furthermore, we examined auditors for these firms and found that Nevada corporations were audited by smaller audit firms; a finding consistent with Barzuza and Smith (2011) .
Relative to market averages, the Big 4 audited significantly fewer Nevada corporations and more Delaware corporations in 2011. These relative measures, developed in Table 4 , are presented for Nevada and Delaware, respectively, in Figures 4 and 5. We find Nevada"s under representation by Big 4 auditors compelling and warrants further investigation and explanation.
14 Data was obtained from Compustat. Only U.S. corporations were analyzed. Firms with missing data on total assets, total revenue, market capitalization, state of incorporation, or auditor (including unaudited firms) were removed. For 2011, the Compustat population contained 5,365 firms (see Table 2 ).
By taking advantage of agency relationships and providing benefits to management, Nevada may have identified a niche market for exploitation, and represent a partial explanation for the Nevada effect.
[Insert Table 4 and Figures 4 and 5 here]
LIMITATIONS, DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We cannot and do not attempt to explain why Nevada corporations enjoy a disproportionately low representation of Big 4 auditors. We do not believe that it is likely that this research question could be adequately addressed in a single paper. Instead, we introduce this issue as a topic of interest to accounting and auditing professionals and academics, using the data We also know that, as client risk rises auditors can either increase their audit fee by pricing the additional risk or not reject the audit engagement (Carson, Simnett, Soo and Wright 2005 Nevada corporations are riskier, we would expect these firms to seek big 4 auditors.
Our motivation and the purpose of this paper is to encourage others to back-test published studies, and participate in the design of additional studies, as we have done in the case of the MKK data, and to examine the impact and relevance of the Nevada effect. Extensions of our analysis may prove useful to the SEC, PCAOB, and other regulators. Published works, particularly in the auditing literature stream, might provide a reasonable vehicle for the development of proxies to test and determine why the Big 4 is so terribly underrepresented for Nevada corporations, and to what extent this underrepresentation is a function of the Nevada effect. 
